A South African op-ed headline from Independent Online (IOL) has reopened the question of which government, Moscow's or Kyiv's, has done more to destabilize global food supply since 2022. The framing is itself a story, because the answer depends on which supply chain segment a buyer is watching.

The IOL piece, titled "Who is really undermining global food security: Russia or Ukraine?", joins a chorus of commentary that has run since the Black Sea Grain Initiative collapsed and again after Ukraine imposed its own export licensing regime on certain crops.

What does each country actually export?

Russia sits among the world's top three wheat shippers and is a leading exporter of nitrogen, phosphate and potash fertilizers. Ukraine is the leading global exporter of sunflower oil and a significant exporter of corn and wheat. Between them, the two countries have historically supplied roughly a quarter of internationally traded wheat. A disruption in either export stream moves benchmark prices in Chicago, Paris and Mumbai within days.

What has Russia done that critics cite?

Moscow's critics point to three actions:

• Continued strikes on Ukrainian port and storage infrastructure
• Suspension of participation in the UN-brokered Black Sea shipping arrangement
• Use of fertilizer and grain export quotas as leverage in sanctions disputes

The Russian government has argued that Western sanctions on its banking and shipping sectors, not Russian policy, have constrained export flows.

What has Ukraine done that critics cite?

Kyiv's critics point to a different set of measures:

• Temporary export licensing for certain grains and oilseeds
• Anti-dumping complaints against neighboring EU member states
• Diversion of rail capacity toward western border crossings, which lengthens delivery cycles for traditional Black Sea buyers

Ukraine's government has framed each measure as necessary to protect domestic food security and stabilize farmer income during wartime.

How do these actions affect importers?

For buyers in Egypt, Tunisia, Indonesia and Bangladesh, the practical effect has been higher delivered costs rather than absolute shortages. Shipping insurance premiums for Black Sea hulls climbed sharply after 2022, and many importers shifted purchases to French, Australian or Argentine origin. The cost wedge between Black Sea and non-Black Sea wheat has narrowed and widened several times since, largely on policy news.

Why does the framing matter?

A binary "Russia or Ukraine" question, by definition, omits the third variable that agribusinesses actually price: the reaction of trading houses, banks and shipowners. Each sanctions cycle or licensing change is filtered through private-sector compliance teams before it reaches a buyer's spreadsheet. Treating the question as a two-country referendum can obscure how decisions made in Geneva, Brussels and Washington shape what ultimately arrives at port.

What should agribusinesses watch next?

Three indicators will clarify the supply picture in coming months:

• Black Sea insurance and freight quotes
• Ukrainian licensing decisions for the 2025/26 marketing year
• Russian wheat export tax and quota adjustments

The first will signal physical risk. The second will signal Ukrainian policy intent. The third will signal how much Russian grain is actually leaving the country. Until at least one of those variables normalizes, food-importing governments should expect continued pressure on foreign-exchange reserves and consumer bread prices.